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REVIEW 
 
Cynthia R. Nielsen, Foucault, Douglass, Fanon, and Scotus in Dialogue: On Social 
Construction and Freedom (New York; Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), ISBN: 978-
1137034106. 
 
In Foucault, Douglass, Fanon, and Scotus in Dialogue: On Social Construction and Freedom, Dr. 
Cynthia R. Nielsen, Catherine of Siena Fellow at Villanova University, brings four timeless 
thinkers together into a captivating discussion of power, resistance, and freedom. Nielsen’s 
readings of Michel Foucault, Frederick Douglass, Frantz Fanon, and John Duns Scotus con-
verge here into a valuable synthesis of the ideas of some perhaps unlikely dialogue partners 
who come from very different times and historical situations. This book - as a contribution 
to the series New Approaches to Religion and Power, edited by Joerg Rieger - is an inspiring 
example of scholarly harmonization, a theme that is lucidly illustrated throughout by Niel-
sen’s use of musical analogies. Her project artfully weaves together Foucault’s theory of 
power and subjectivity, Douglass’s lived experience of resistance, Fanon’s symphonic hu-
manism, and Scotus’s ontology of multidimensional freedom into a tapestry of emancipa-
tion and transformation.  
The first chapter, “Themes and Their Variations: Harmonizing Humans as Socially 
Constructed and Free?” begins with a triplet of statements which echo the first lines of Ai-
mé Césaire’s Discourse on Colonialism: 
 
A destiny that proclaims one people or nation superior to all others is a flawed destiny.  
A destiny that scripts subjectivities while asserting their fixity is a deceitful destiny. 
A destiny that reduces human beings to commodities is a grotesque destiny (1). 
 
With these declarations, Nielsen establishes the field of her concern, and begins her project 
of articulating a philosophical system that can accommodate the re-scripting of subjectivi-
ties in a way that runs counter to these oppressive destinies. She presents to the reader the 
theory of race as a socially-constructed phenomenon, a theory in which the contents of no-
tions such as “blackness” are “constructed intentionally as well as unintentionally through 
discourses, institutions, traditions, and sociopolitical practices” (11). Although Nielsen is a 
proponent of social constructionism, she does not endorse the view that human beings are 
solely the products of social forces. By harmonizing the philosophies of the four thinkers, 
Nielsen is able to fashion a system that acknowledges the fundamental free agency at the 
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core of human subjectivity - a system that allows human beings to live creatively in re-
sistance to prescribed, and inscribed, oppression. 
Nielsen’s second chapter, “Foucault and Subjectivities,” is concerned with Michel 
Foucault, the enigmatic 20th century French scholar whose life-long work sought to illumi-
nate the various powers and processes that shape human beings into subjects. Though Fou-
cault’s archaeological and genealogical methods of historical analysis both function to re-
veal the contingent nature of historical events and their resulting social consequences in a 
way that suggests that present social formations are malleable, many Foucault scholars be-
lieve that his strong emphasis on historical and social contingency de-centers the subject to 
an extent that genuine human agency is rendered void. Nielsen argues against this wide-
spread understanding, and claims that Foucault’s conception of power relations presuppos-
es free subjects at the core of every formation of subjectivity. 
Nielsen describes Foucault’s early work as a project that focuses primarily on the 
ways in which human beings are influenced by institutions, practices, and discourses; in his 
later work, however, Foucault begins to shift his attention toward the ways in which indi-
viduals are able to reconstitute their “selves” despite the ever-present powers of social con-
struction. Nielsen rightly points out that both of these processes – subjectification and sub-
ject self-creation – imply that a singular site of selfhood exists. Though Foucault does not 
consider this site to be the pure sovereign subject of the Western Enlightenment tradition, it 
nevertheless is something uniquely personal, something to be cared for, and something to 
be artistically refashioned in practices of liberation. Because Foucault was reluctant to root 
this theory of selfhood in any kind of transcendent, universal human ontology, Nielsen 
turns to the other three thinkers to enhance and extend Foucault’s project by grounding it in 
theories that establish freedom as an inalienable human right, or condition.  
In the third chapter, “Frederick Douglass on Power Relations and Resistance ‘From 
Below,’” Nielsen turns to the life and writings of Frederick Douglass, the 19th century social 
reformer who experienced an exodus from chattel slavery to freedom. In Douglass, Nielsen 
sees an archetypical illustration for Foucault’s description of the dynamism of power rela-
tions. Douglass’s dehumanizing experiences with the slave-breaker Edward Covey provide 
particularly excellent examples of how power operates through individuals and societies in 
the construction of subjects; likewise, Douglass’s assertion of his humanity, which culmi-
nates in an act of physical resistance to Covey’s violence, shows that every manifestation of 
power entails an implicit opportunity for resistance.  
Nielsen also draws attention to the presence of a trademark Foucauldian theme in 
Douglass’s life: the “intimate relation” between knowledge and power (58). Douglass was 
first given reading lessons by Sophie Auld, the wife of his master, Thomas Auld. When Mr. 
Auld discovered that his wife was teaching Douglass to read, he immediately put an end to 
the activities, as he understood that educating slaves could produce discontentment. 
Douglass remained active in seeking educational opportunities wherever possible, but 
found that the enlightenment of his mind also brought sorrow and torment in light of his 
physical captivity. According to Nielsen, this conflict between mental freedom and physical 
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enslavement reveals the presence of an a priori human need for freedom: “Douglass’s litera-
cy, while no doubt providing him a new and invaluable mental freedom, nonetheless, was 
insufficient for a flesh-and-blood, embodied human being to flourish in this world.” (p. 60) 
Foucault is once again brought to the discussion as Nielsen reminds us that his theory of 
power relations requires the presence of ultimately free subjects beneath layers of social 
construction. Though Douglass’s subjectivity was constructed as a slave-subject, at his very 
core there remained an ontologically free being.  
Nielsen’s fourth chapter, “Fanon on Decolonizing Colonized Subjectivities and the 
Quest for an Historically Attuned Symphonic Humanism,” presents the contributions of 
Frantz Fanon, a 20th century psychiatrist/philosopher/revolutionary from Martinique whose 
experiences within predominantly white French intellectual circles, as well as his activities 
as a member of the National Liberation Front in the Algerian Revolution, gave him special 
insight into the psychology of colonialism and oppression. Fanon’s work provides a social-
psychological account of racism, one derived from his own experiences in a world domi-
nated by Imperialism. Nielsen brings Fanon into the discussion particularly for his descrip-
tions of how racial identities, or identities of inferiority, are socially constructed, prescribed, 
and finally internalized by those they are intended to subjugate.  
Nielsen relays a story from Black Skin, White Masks, in which Fanon is confronted 
with the “white gaze” while riding on a train. As a young child cries, “Look! A Negro!” and 
draws attention to Fanon’s presence, he does not only become conscious of the white gaze 
through which he is viewed within society, but also gains an awareness of his own ability to 
see himself through that gaze. Nielsen relates Fanon’s experience of the white gaze to Fou-
cault’s description of Bentham’s Panopticon as a structure built for maximal surveillance 
capabilities. The design of the Panopticon places the subjects of surveillance in a position 
where they believe they are under constant surveillance, though they cannot see their ob-
servers. This inability to see their observer creates a situation in which people act as if they 
are being observed, though in reality there may be no one actually observing them. Fou-
cault shows how social norms, expressed “Panoptically” via institutions, discourses, and 
practices, authoritatively operate to shape human beings into particular subject formations. 
Likewise, the white gaze transmits a history, an account of racism that operates to trans-
form its subject. According to Fanon, the white gaze embodies a historico-racial schema that 
is forced upon an “Other” until she inscribes it, and internalizes it as a primary constitutive 
foundation of her identity.  
Fanon argues that this social prescription, this “out-sourcing” of one’s history and 
identity, must be rejected, and that new narratives of selfhood must overwrite the biog-
raphies contained within the white gaze. Nielsen points out that Fanon’s philosophy 
“acknowledges the black person’s agency or active participation in the present unfolding of 
this already given white-scripted history” (83). Though Fanon recognizes the potential dif-
ficulty in acting against the great constraints of social influence, the presence of this under-
lying agency is once again determined by Nielsen to be the critical ontological fact that 
permits acts of resistance, and self re-narration.     
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In chapter five, “Duns Scotus and Multidimensional Freedom,” Nielsen invites the 
work of the medieval philosopher-theologian John Duns Scotus into the discussion. In the 
previous chapters on Foucault, Douglass, and Fanon, Nielsen continually points to the 
ways in which their philosophies imply the existence of a foundational free self as the site 
where processes of social construction operate. Nielsen now reveals Scotus’s ontology of 
human freedom to be the missing ingredient, the final piece of the puzzle that allows the 
existence of a field of possibility for the elaboration of the other writers’ emancipatory theo-
ries. Up to this point in the book, Nielsen is largely focused on describing social construc-
tionist accounts of subject formation, and showing how the effects of social construction can 
be overridden; Scotus is important to this discussion because his ontology of human free-
dom can provide justification for the reasons why we ought to oppose any form of oppres-
sive subjectification. 
According to Nielsen, Scotus bases his ontology of freedom in his characterization of 
will as a “distinct, active, self-determining power” (103). For Scotus, will is distinguished 
from intellect in that it exhibits flexibility, and freedom of choice. For example, intellect is 
limited in that it can only assent to propositions without real alternatives, such as “2+2=4.” 
Conversely, will operates in situations where one must choose from a set of possibilities. In 
Nielsen’s words, Scotus concludes that “will constitutes a rational faculty with a greater op-
erational extension and thus a greater operational capacity than that of the intellect” (107). 
The primacy of will in this sense is significant, as it draws attention to the primordial free-
dom in which will is exercised.   
Nielsen claims that Scotus’s account of metaphysical freedom “helps us to under-
stand and to explain why humans typically resist the kind of dominating, inflexible rela-
tions of which Foucault disapproves but has no recourse to defend or justify” (104). This 
account can also help us understand how “resistance to oppressive regimes and dominating 
relations is a fairly constant, empirical, and transcultural phenomenon” (104). Thus, by 
bringing Scotus into dialogue with Foucault, Nielsen is able to synthesize a philosophical 
system in which we may understand how power and resistance function in human rela-
tions, as well as an ontology that supports the creation and preservation of freedom in those 
very relations.   
In the final, recapitulatory chapter, Nielsen once again echoes Césaire’s triplets; this 
time, however, the timbre of the statements has changed. Whereas the first set of triplets 
denounced the injustice of oppressive, prescribed destinies, this final set conveys the hope 
that lies in the possibility of re-writing the narrative of human lives as: 
 
A faith-strengthening narrative: that is, a narrative that affirms our finitude and frailty, as well 
as our relational dependence; 
A hope-inspiring narrative: that is, a narrative that does not deny the dislocation of this world 
yet compels us to manifest the “not yet” in the “already”; 
A love-engendering narrative: that is, a narrative that allows multiple voices to contribute dis-
tinctive melodies to an unfinished symphonic masterpiece (148).    
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Nielsen’s synthetic work in Foucault, Douglass, Fanon, and Scotus in Dialogue is of great value 
as a wonderful example of how philosophers can construct liberating and emancipatory 
theories by harmonizing the ideas of the many great thinkers we revere within the philo-
sophical canon. Too often we find ourselves mired in combative work, hunting for the 
weaknesses in the arguments of our philosophical adversaries. Nielsen’s approach reminds 
us that ideas can be blended into beautiful configurations, in the same way that blending 
colors on a painter’s palette can yield all of the hues required to reflect the way we see the 
world.           
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